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1. See Elizabeth Kennedy, Employed by an Algorithm: Labor Rights in the On-Demand Economy,
40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 987, 992 (2017) (noting that the gig economy is projected to be worth $335 Billion
by 2025).
2. See Dmitri Iglitzin & Jennifer L. Robbins, The City of Seattle’s Ordinance Providing Collective
Bargaining Rights to Independent Contractor For-Hire Drivers: An Analysis Of The Major Legal Hurdles, 38 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 49, 52 (2017).
3. Id.
4. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2018).
5. See Rick Bales, Resurrecting Labor, 77 MD. L. REV. 1, 42 (2017) (arguing that the protections
of the National Labor Relations Act should be extended to on-demand workers); Seth D. Harris & Alan
B. Krueger, A Proposal for Modernizing Labor Laws for Twenty-First Century Work: The “Independent
Worker,” THE HAMILTON PROJECT 15 (2015),
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As the gig economy continues to grow,1 concerns have been raised that
gig economy workers (“on-demand workers”) do not enjoy the same protections under the law that traditional employees do. 2 And those concerns
should come as no surprise given that on-demand workers are not protected
by state unemployment insurance benefits systems, workers’ compensation
benefits, state and federal minimum wage and overtime laws, federal antidiscrimination laws, anti-retaliation laws, federal collective bargaining laws,
family and medical leave laws, and the benefits of employer contributions
for Social Security and Medicare taxes. 3
This Note focuses on one of the traditional employee protections: the
right to collective bargaining. 4 While several proposals to secure collective
bargaining rights for on-demand workers have been advanced, 5 this Note
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http://www.hamiltonproject.org/papers/modernizing_labor_laws_for_twenty_first_century_work_independent_worker [https://perma.cc/5Y84-EWGL] (arguing for a new category of workers (“independent
workers”) who would have the right to bargain collectively).
6. Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 124968, pmbl. (Dec. 14, 2015).
7. Katy Steinmetz, Exclusive: See How Big the Gig Economy Really is, TIME MAG. (Jan. 6, 2016),
http://time.com/4169532/sharing-economy-poll/ [https://perma.cc/AC77-LS6P].
8. Iglitzin & Robbins, supra note 2, at 50.
9. See Henry H. Perritt, Don’t Burn the Looms: Regulation of Uber and Other Gig Labor Markets,
22 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 51, 146–47 (2019) (proposing that classifying on-demand workers as
employees is an inappropriate solution to remedying the shortcomings faced by on-demand workers under
American labor law).
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assesses the legality of an ordinance passed by the City of Seattle, which
permits drivers who work for companies such as Uber and Lyft (“on-demand
drivers”) to bargain collectively with those companies (“ride-hailing companies”). 6 This Note sets forth two independent arguments that argue in favor
of the Ordinance’s legality. First, the Labor Exemption to the Sherman Antitrust Act exempts the Seattle Ordinance from antitrust liability; and second,
the Seattle Ordinance does not violate the Sherman Antitrust Act because the
Ordinance’s pro-competitive effects on the labor market outweigh the Ordinance’s anti-competitive effects under the Rule of Reason.
Part I outlines the Seattle Ordinance and the current challenge against
the Ordinance by the United States Chamber of Commerce. Part I also provides a background on the Labor Exemption to the Sherman Antitrust Act
and the effects of collective bargaining on competition in the labor market.
Lastly, Part I offers an overview of the gig economy, ride-hailing companies,
and the current status of on-demand drivers. It clarifies that on-demand
workers are independent contractors, 7 and that on-demand drivers are a type
of on-demand worker. 8
Part II argues that the Labor Exemption to the Sherman Antitrust Act
covers the Seattle Ordinance. This section first addresses proposals to categorize on-demand drivers as employees and contends that such proposals are
premised on an incorrect understanding of the Labor Exemption; thus, they
are inadequate solutions to the problem that on-demand workers are unable
to bargain collectively. 9 Instead, by examining the text of the statutes underlying the Labor Exemption, the purpose of the Labor Exemption, the current
conditions of the labor market for on-demand drivers, and Supreme Court
precedent in Labor Exemption cases, it follows that the Labor Exemption
covers the relevant labor market and not just those who are statutorily labeled
as employees. Because the Seattle Ordinance primarily affects only the labor
market, fits the Supreme Court’s definition of a “mandatory subject of collecting bargaining,” and provides a framework for agreements to be products
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of bona fide arm’s length bargaining, 10 Part II concludes that the non-statutory Labor Exemption exempts the Seattle Ordinance from antitrust liability.
Part III presents an argument that is independent of Part II. Part III argues that under the Rule of Reason, 11 the Seattle Ordinance does not violate
the Sherman Antitrust Act because the Ordinance’s pro-competitive effects
on the labor market outweigh the Ordinance’s anti-competitive effects. First,
Part III contends that, despite the presence of a horizontal agreement between
the on-demand drivers, it would be inappropriate to apply the per se rule to
the Ordinance. 12 Instead, the Rule of Reason should be applied to fully analyze the Ordinance’s effects on competition, given that the Ordinance’s
framework permits agreements between on-demand drivers and ride-hailing
companies that impose a vertical price restraint.13 Then, Part III applies the
Rule of Reason to the Seattle Ordinance by weighing the pro-competitive
effects of a vertical price restraint on the labor market against the horizontal
agreement’s assumed anti-competitive nature and the vertical price restraint’s anti-competitive effects. Ultimately, Part III concludes that the former outweighs the latter.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Seattle’s Ordinance & the Challenge by the United States Chamber
of Commerce

06/12/2020 13:18:38

10. See Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976) (ruling that the non-statutory Labor
Exemption applies when an agreement primarily affects only the parties to the agreement, concerns a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining, and is a product of a bona-fide arm’s length bargaining). But
see Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124, 133–34 (2d Cir. 2004) (rejecting the 3-prong test for applying the nonstatutory Labor Exemption as set forth by the Eighth Circuit in Mackey v. NFL).
11. See Smith v. Pro Football, 593 F.2d 1173, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (“Under the rule of reason, a
restraint must be evaluated to determine whether it is significantly anticompetitive in purpose or effect.”).
12. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007) (citation omitted)
(“Restraints that are per se unlawful include horizontal agreements among competitors to fix
prices . . . .”).
13. See id. at 899 (2007) (“[T]he rule of reason, not a per se rule of unlawfulness, would be the
appropriate standard to judge vertical price restraints.”).
14. Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. City of Seattle, 890 F.3d 769, 775 (9th Cir. 2018)
(footnote omitted).
15. Id. at 777 (citation omitted).
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On December 14, 2015, the City of Seattle enacted Ordinance 124968,
which permitted on-demand drivers to bargain collectively with ride-hailing
companies.14 By excluding the Ordinance’s application to those “in the context of an employer-employee relationship,” the Ordinance strictly applies to
independent contractors. 15 Before on-demand drivers can bargain collectively with a ride-hailing company, both the on-demand drivers and the ride-
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16. SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 6.310.735(C) (2015). It is worth noting that the director
also oversees business regulations in the taxicab industry in Seattle. See Dep’t of Fin. and Admin. Servs.,
Taxis, For-Hires and Transportation Network Companies, SEATTLE.GOV, https://www.seattle.gov/business-regulations/taxis-for-hires-and-tncs (last updated Dec. 13, 2018).
17. § 6.310.735(C)(2).
18. Id. § 6.310.735(D); see City of Seattle, 890 F.3d at 776 (noting that Uber and Lyft provide an
online platform, which on-demand drivers use to provide individual rides to consumers).
19. § 6.310.735(E).
20. Id. § 6.310.735(F)(1).
21. Id. § 6.310.735(F).
22. Id. § 6.310.735(H)(1).
23. Id.
24. Id. § 6.310.735(H)(2).
25. Id. § 6.310.735(H)(2)(a).

42394-ckt_95-1 Sheet No. 156 Side A

hailing company must satisfy certain requirements as set forth by the Ordinance.
First, an individual (“the representative”) must be selected to represent
the on-demand drivers; then, the representative must be approved by the City
of Seattle’s Director of Finance and Administrative Services (“the director”). 16 Following the director’s approval, the representative must inform the
ride-hailing company that she or he intends to represent the company’s ondemand drivers. 17 After the ride-hailing company is informed of the intended
representation, the company must provide the representative with the contact
information of all on-demand drivers who have provided driving services
under the company’s platform.18
Next, the representative contacts the on-demand drivers and inquires
whether they are interested in being represented.19 If interested, the on-demand driver provides the representative with a written statement expressing
that interest.20 Then, the representative submits these statements to the director, and if a majority of the drivers support the representative, the director
certifies the representative as the sole individual who may represent the ondemand drivers for that particular ride-hailing company. 21
Finally, the representative and the ride-hailing company must meet and
bargain collectively over a variety of subjects. 22 For this Note’s purposes,
the most important subject is “the nature and amount of payments to be made
by, or withheld from, the [ride-hailing company] to or by the drivers.” 23 If
an agreement between the representative and ride-hailing company is
reached, it is submitted to the director who ensures that the agreement complies with the purposes and public policy goals of the Ordinance. 24 “If the
[d]irector finds the agreement compliant, the agreement is final and binding
on all parties.” 25
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26. Id. § 6.310.735(H)(2)(b).
27. Id. § 6.310.735(I).
28. Id. § 6.310.735(I)(4)(a).
29. Id. § 6.310.735(J).
30. Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. City of Seattle, 890 F.3d 769, 778 (9th Cir.
2018).
31. Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. City of Seattle, No. C16-0322RSL, 2016 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 122723, at *11–12 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 9, 2016).
32. City of Seattle, 890 F.3d at 779.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 776.
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On the other hand, if the agreement is non-compliant, the director shall
remand the agreement to the parties with recommendations for how to remedy the agreement’s shortcomings.26 Should the parties fail to reach an
agreement, “either party must submit to interest arbitration upon the request
of the other,” and then, a mutually agreed upon arbitrator shall propose an
agreement between the parties.27 If the director finds the arbitrator’s proposed agreement to be compliant, then it becomes binding on the parties.28
At any time during the term of the agreement, the parties may propose
amendments to the agreement, which must be approved by the director. 29
On March 3, 2016, the United States Chamber of Commerce filed a
lawsuit, arguing that the Ordinance violated federal antitrust law and was
preempted by federal antitrust law and the National Labor Relations Act.30
The District Court for the Western District of Washington held that the
Chamber lacked standing because no representatives had been approved by
the director, so the case was dismissed.31 On March 3, 2017, the director
approved an individual to be a representative, which prompted the Chamber
to file suit again, challenging the Ordinance on the same grounds as before
and requesting a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the Ordinance.32 The District Court granted the Chamber’s preliminary injunction,
but on August 1, 2017, the District Court granted the City of Seattle’s motion
to dismiss. 33
The Chamber filed an appeal and an emergency motion for an injunction against the Ordinance in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit. 34 The Court of Appeals granted the Chamber’s emergency
motion pending the appeal. 35 Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court’s dismissal of the Chamber’s federal antitrust claims.36 Although
the Ninth Circuit’s decision was primarily premised on doctrines of preemption and state immunity, which are outside the scope of this Note, the federal
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antitrust claims remanded to the District Court are the sole focus of this
Note. 37
B. The Labor Exemption to the Sherman Antitrust Act
Antitrust law aims to “enhance consumer welfare by ensuring that competition regulates markets.” 38 And the Sherman Antitrust Act of 189039 is
premised on the idea that “the interaction of competitive forces will yield the
best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality, and the greatest material progress . . . .” 40 Section 1 of the Act prohibits
contracts or agreements, which restrain trade or commerce, and Section 2
prohibits monopolization in a particular industry. 41
The federal courts initially viewed labor union activities as unlawful
conspiracies to prevent trade and employed the Sherman Antitrust Act to
issue injunctions against labor union activities. 42 Employers frequently used
injunctions to “stifl[e] labor disputes . . . [and] to defeat unions instantly by
preventing them from using self-help and destroying the momentum of
strikes before substantive legal rights were litigated.”43 Any collective activity of labor, whether a strike or a boycott, was commonly held to be an unlawful restraint of trade.44 As a result of the frequent injunctions against labor
union activity, 45 Congress passed the Clayton Antitrust Act in 191446 and the
Norris-LaGuardia Act in 1932, 47 which are commonly considered to be the
sources of the statutory Labor Exemption. 48 The Clayton Antitrust Act provided that antitrust law did not forbid labor unions from “lawfully carrying
out . . . legitimate objects” and that labor unions were not “illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws.”49 And the
42394-ckt_95-1 Sheet No. 157 Side A
06/12/2020 13:18:38

37. See id. at 795.
38. Henry H. Perritt, Competitive Entertainment: Implications of the NFL Lockout Litigation for
Sports, Theatre, Music, and Video Entertainment, 35 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 93, 127 (2012) (footnote omitted).
39. Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2018)).
40. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
41. Sherman Antitrust Act §§ 1-2.
42. See Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 308–09 (1908) (holding that workers organizing together
to pursue their interests was an unlawful restraint of trade), superseded by statute, Clayton Act, Pub. L.
No. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730 (1914).
43. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters Local 174, 203 F.3d 703, 707 (9th Cir.
2000) (en banc).
44. Nat’l Woodwork Mfrs. Ass’n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 620 (1967).
45. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters Local 174, 203 F.3d at 707.
46. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (2018); 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53 (2018).
47. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115.
48. See Perritt, supra note 38, at 135–36.
49. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (§ 6 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731).
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50. 29 U.S.C. § 101 (§ 1 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70); see Milk Wagon Drivers’ Union, Local No. 753 v. Lake Valley Farm Prods., 311 U.S. 91, 101 (1940) (ruling that the Norris-LaGuardia
Act intended to end the granting of injunctions “based upon complaints charging conspiracies to violate
the Sherman Antitrust Act.”).
51. Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 611 (8th Cir. 1976).
52. See Perritt, supra note 38, at 136.
53. 45 U.S.C. § 152 (2018).
54. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2018).
55. Perritt, supra note 38, at 135.
56. Id. at 132.
57. Id.
58. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 491–93 (1940).
59. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622 (1975).
60. Perritt, supra note 38, at 136 (emphasis added).
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Norris-LaGuardia Act prevented federal courts from issuing “any restraining
order or temporary or permanent injunction . . . involving or growing out of
a labor dispute.” 50
Taken together, these Acts insulated “legitimate collective activity by
employees . . . from the proscriptions of the antitrust laws.” 51 One of these
legitimate collective activities protected by the Labor Exemption is employees unilaterally organizing themselves into unions for the purposes of collective bargaining.52 Subsequent federal legislation, such as the Railway
Labor Act of 1926 53 and the National Labor Relations Act of 1935,54 legitimized the statutory Labor Exemption by granting “broad rights to employees
to engage in collective bargaining through representatives of their choice.”55
On its face, collective bargaining inherently limits competition because it
seeks to create “private agreements to restrain competition in labor markets.” 56 A simple example of such an agreement is one where a labor union
and an employer agree to fix wages; or in other words, they agree to fix the
price at which the workers will sell their labor to the employer. A slightly
more complicated example is an agreement where the employer agrees to
hire only workers and future workers from a particular labor union, creating
a monopoly in the labor market by restricting the supply of labor and a monopsony in the labor market by restricting the demand for labor. 57
Although the Sherman Antitrust Act intended to target agreements between businessmen in response to the anticompetitive and monopolistic tactics of the era, 58 the Supreme Court held that the statutory Labor Exemption
did not exempt bilateral activity, such as “concerted action or agreements
between unions and nonlabor parties.” 59 In other words, “[w]hen labor unions enter into agreements with others such as employers . . . they are outside
the statutory [labor] exemption.” 60 This was critical because an employer

42394-ckt_95-1 Sheet No. 158 Side A

06/12/2020 13:18:38

12 ALEKNAVICUS MACRO 1 EIC 5.4 (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

5/8/2020 11:26 PM

ON-DEMAND DRIVERS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

307

must be present at the bargaining table for collective bargaining to occur, and
frequently, multi-employer bargains are sought by unions. 61
The Supreme Court first addressed a restraint on competition imposed
through collective bargaining in Allen Bradley Company v. Local Union No.
3, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, where it held that a labor
union’s agreements with all local electrical manufacturers and contractors
“to eliminate all competition among themselves and to prevent all competition from others” in the relevant product market were not covered by the
statutory Labor Exemption; and thus, the agreements violated the Sherman
Antitrust Act. 62 Twenty years later, the Court reached a similar conclusion
in United Mine Workers v. Pennington where it held that a labor union’s
agreement with several large coal operators, which ultimately aimed to eliminate smaller operators from the industry, was not covered by the statutory
Labor Exemption because the agreement primarily affected the product market. 63
However, on the same day that the Supreme Court decided Pennington,
the Court also decided Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters &
Butcher Workmen v. Jewel Tea Company, where the Court set forth the nonstatutory Labor Exemption, 64 which shields agreements between a labor union and a nonlabor party if the agreement is “intimately related to the union’s
vital concerns of wages, hours, and working conditions.” 65 As explained by
the Supreme Court:

In Jewel Tea Company, the Court held that the labor union was covered
by the non-statutory Labor Exemption because its agreement covered only

06/12/2020 13:18:38

61. See NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449, 353 U.S. 87, 89 (1957) (involving a multiemployer collective bargaining agreement between a union and 8 employers in the linen supply business).
62. 325 U.S. 797, 809–10 (1945).
63. 381 U.S. 657, 663–66 (1965).
64. 381 U.S. 676, 689–90 (1965).
65. H.A. Artists & Assocs. v. Actors’ Equity Ass’n, 451 U.S. 704, 716 n.19 (1981) (citation omitted).
66. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622 (1975)
(citations omitted).
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The nonstatutory exemption has its source in the strong labor policy favoring the association of employees to eliminate competition over wages
and working conditions. Union success in organizing workers and standardizing wages ultimately will affect price competition among employers,
but the goals of federal labor law never could be achieved if this effect on
business competition were held a violation of the antitrust laws. The Court
therefore has acknowledged that labor policy requires tolerance for lessening of business competition based on differences in wages and working
conditions. 66
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marketing-hours restrictions in the labor market.67 Thus, courts have interpreted the Supreme Court’s precedent to suggest that collective bargaining
agreements violate the Sherman Antitrust Act when the agreement reaches
beyond the labor market and hurts the parties’ competitors by creating an
anti-competitive effect in the product market.68
Historically, federal courts have applied the Labor Exemption only to
agreements that involve workers who are statutorily labeled as “employees.” 69 Courts reasoned that the Labor Exemption should only cover employees because “only employees were thought to need the protection from their
employers . . . .” 70 Independent contractors were considered to have more
bargaining power than employees because “they were typically highly
skilled workers who commanded premium wages on the open market and
could provide their services to . . . customers on a project-by-project basis,
rather than being tied to a single employer.” 71 As a result, courts have generally held that independent contractors are not covered by the Labor Exemption. 72 While the view that only employees needed protection from their
employers once held firm weight, the recent emergence of the gig economy
has seriously called that view into question.
C. The Current State of the Gig Economy and Ride-Hailing
Companies

06/12/2020 13:18:38

67. 381 U.S. at 689–93.
68. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 50 F.3d 1041, 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
69. See Perritt, supra note 38, at 140.
70. Perritt, supra note 9, at 56–57.
71. Michael L. Nadler, Independent Employees: A New Category of Workers for the Gig Economy,
19 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 443, 460 (2018).
72. See Perritt, supra note 38, at 142; Taylor v. Local No. 7, Int’l Union of Journeymen Horseshoers, 353 F.2d 593, 606 (4th Cir. 1965) (en banc) (holding that the respondents’ activity was not protected
by the Labor Exemption because they were independent contractors). But see Am. Fed. of Musicians v.
Carroll, 391 U.S. 99, 106 (1968) (quoting Carroll v. Am. Fed. of Musicians, 241 F. Supp. 865, 887
(S.D.N.Y. 1965)) (holding that the non-statutory Labor Exemption applied to a group of orchestra leaders
because they were a “‘labor group’ and party to a labor dispute under the Norris-LaGuardia Act” although
they were independent contractors).
73. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 992.
74. James de Haan, The Über-Union: Re-Thinking Collective Bargaining for the Gig Economy, 12
CHARLESTON L. REV. 97, 99 (2017).

42394-ckt_95-1 Sheet No. 158 Side B

The gig economy is “an economic system that uses online platforms to
connect workers . . . with clients and consumers.” 73 Typically, a business
provides a platform through a smartphone application, which on-demand
workers use to perform work on a free-lance basis for consumers. 74 The consumers “pay ‘piece-rate’ for the goods or services, and the online
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75. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 992.
76. See Steinmetz, supra note 7 (“44% of U.S. adults have participated in such transactions, playing
the roles of lenders and borrowers, drivers and riders, hosts and guests.”).
77. See Brett Harris, Uber, Lyft, and Regulating the Sharing Economy, 41 SEATTLE U. L. Rev. 269,
271 (2017) (“In 2013, the [gig economy] was valued at $26 billion.”).
78. Id.
79. Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. City of Seattle, 890 F.3d 769, 776 (9th Cir.
2018).
80. Sanjukta M. Paul, Uber as For-Profit Hiring Hall: A Price-Fixing Paradox and its Implications, 38 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 233, 237 (2017).
81. Perritt, supra note 9, at 59–60.
82. City of Seattle, 890 F.3d at 776.
83. Paul, supra note 80, at 237.
84. Perritt, supra note 9, at 60–61.
85. City of Seattle, 890 F.3d at 776.
86. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 993.
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intermediary takes a fee for facilitating the transaction.”75 Given the convenience and flexibility provided by these platforms, nearly half of adults in the
United States have participated in the gig economy, either as consumers or
as on-demand workers. 76 As a result, business is booming in the gig economy. 77
While companies such as Handy, Airbnb, and Postmates are wellknown, “[t]he most widely recognized [gig] economy companies are ‘ride
[hailing]’ companies, such as Uber and Lyft.” 78 For example, consumers use
the Uber app or the Lyft app to request a ride. 79 Then, the app matches the
consumer with an on-demand driver based on location, “uses a pricing algorithm to set [a] fare for [the] ride,” and provides a way for the consumer to
pay the on-demand driver. 80 The platform navigates the on-demand driver to
the consumer’s pick up location; 81 then, the on-demand driver drives the individual to her or his destination, and upon completion of the ride, the consumer pays the on-demand driver through the app. 82 The ride-hailing
company receives a percentage of the on-demand driver’s compensation for
the ride, which is a software licensing fee for using the ride-hailing company’s platform. 83 Also, ride-hailing companies use “surge pricing,” which
increases a ride’s fare due to a higher supply of consumers than on-demand
drivers in a given area, as well as other factors, such as distance, weather,
and time. 84 Lastly, most, if not all, ride-hailing companies allow on-demand
drivers to drive for other ride-hailing companies’ platforms. 85
Central to the business model of ride-hailing companies “is the characterization of its workforce as ‘independent contractors,’ rather than employees.” 86 And by the business model’s inherent design, the self-determining
schedules of on-demand drivers makes it difficult for them to come together
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to take collective action.87 Not surprisingly, on-demand drivers do not fit the
traditional labor-law categories. Thus, on-demand drivers do not have a “recognized [federal] legal right to bargain collectively with their employers in
regard to the terms and conditions of their employment.”88 But given the
growth of the gig economy, American labor law can no longer turn a blind
eye to the disparities in bargaining power between traditional employees and
a growing number of on-demand drivers in the gig economy.
II. THE LABOR EXEMPTION TO THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT EXEMPTS
THE SEATTLE ORDINANCE FROM ANTITRUST LIABILITY.
A. The Problem with the Employee - Independent Contractor
Distinction

06/12/2020 13:18:38

87. Id.
88. Iglitzin & Robbins, supra note 2, at 50.
89. See Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1081–82 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“Perhaps Lyft drivers
who work more than a certain number of hours should be employees while the others should be independent contractors.”); Alex Kirven, Whose Gig is it Anyway? Technological Change, Workplace Control
and Supervision, and Workers’ Rights in the Gig Economy, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 249, 289 (2018) (arguing
that on-demand drivers should be classified as employees because they provide a service that ride-hailing
companies are economically dependent on).
90. Perritt, supra note 9, at 55.
91. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07 (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
92. Marina Lao, Workers in the “Gig” Economy: The Case for Extending the Antitrust Labor Exemption, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1543, 1575 (2018).
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Recognizing that employees have the federal right to bargain collectively, while independent contractors do not, some have proposed that Congress or the courts should consider certain factors, such as working hours
and economic dependence, as a means to categorize independent contractors
– specifically, on-demand drivers – as employees, which would secure them
the federal right to collective bargaining.89 But any approach that seeks to
categorize on-demand drivers within the same legal category as employees
is misguided for several reasons.
First, on-demand drivers’ relationship with a ride-hailing company’s
platform is fundamentally different from the relationship that a traditional
employee has with an employer. 90 The law recognizes a traditional employer-employee relationship when the employer maintains control over an
employee in regard to the employee’s wages, hours, working conditions, and
duties or tasks. 91 Meanwhile, ride-hailing companies “rely on new business
models that thrive on fluid part-time work relationships, rather than traditional employment with employer-controlled work schedules and hours.” 92
Second, given the different relationship structures in which on-demand
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drivers and employees provide their labor, categorizing on-demand drivers
as employees “would require fundamental structural changes” to ride-hailing
companies’ business models, which would severely diminish the flexibility
for workers that made the ride-hailing companies’ business model attractive
to begin with. 93 Also, such changes could greatly reduce the efficiency of a
ride-hailing company’s platform to connect on-demand drivers with consumers. 94
Third, such fundamental structural changes would “produce inefficient
outcomes and . . . undermine efficient and equitable distribution of resources.” 95 If a ride-hailing company has to maintain an employer-employee
relationship with each on-demand driver, managing the platform would increase administrative costs and cause logistical issues. 96 As a result, ridehailing companies would likely terminate on-demand drivers whose working
hours are low or inconsistent in order to save costs. 97 Another undesirable
consequence of maintaining such an employer-employee relationship is that
on-demand drivers would not be able to work for multiple platforms because
a ride-hailing company, as an employer, would expect an on-demand driver,
as an employee, to not work for a competitor; and this would ultimately reduce competition between the platforms and could lead to a single platform
dominating the market. 98 Thus, on-demand drivers should not be classified
as employees because “[t]hey do not satisfy the traditional legal criteria for
that status” 99 and because of the negative economic consequences that would
arise from such a classification. Instead of categorizing on-demand drivers
as employees in order to cover them under the Labor Exemption, I argue the
inverse: The Labor Exemption covers labor markets, including Seattle’s ondemand driver labor market at issue here.
42394-ckt_95-1 Sheet No. 160 Side A
06/12/2020 13:18:38

93. Id.; see Perritt, supra note 9, at 123 (“Classification of ride-hailing drivers as employees would
subject them to all of the traditional types of labor and employment protection, forcing a considerable
modification of existing practices.”).
94. See Lao, supra note 92, at 1574.
95. Perritt, supra note 9, at 55; see Harris & Krueger, supra note 5, at 8 (“Forcing these new forms
of work into a traditional employment relationship could be an existential threat to the emergence of
online-intermediated work, with adverse consequences for workers, consumers, businesses, and the economy.”).
96. Lao, supra note 92, at 1578.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1580.
99. Perritt, supra note 9, at 146.
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B. The Labor Exemption applies because it covers particular labor
markets, including the labor market for on-demand drivers
Although such a broad interpretation of the Labor Exemption may appear unorthodox at first, the interpretation finds support in a variety of
sources. First, it draws support from the text of the statutes underlying the
Labor Exemption. Second, the interpretation attracts support from the Labor
Exemption’s purpose to help workers improve the conditions of their labor
through collective bargaining, 100 especially when considering the current
conditions of the labor market for on-demand drivers. And third, the interpretation is strengthened by the Supreme Court’s precedent in Labor Exemption cases, which has suggested that the Exemption covers labor agreements
and disputes that involve more than just employees.
1. The Text of the Clayton Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act
The Labor Exemption “traces its origin to sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act . . . and to the Norris-LaGuardia Act.” 101 Beginning with the Clayton
Act, section 6 states:
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce.
Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the
existence and operation of labor . . . organizations, instituted for the purposes of mutual help . . . or to forbid or restrain individual members of
such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects
thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be held or
construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade,
under the antitrust laws. 102

06/12/2020 13:18:38

100. See Paul, supra note 80, at 235 (“[T]he [L]abor [E]xemption . . . creates the space for affirmative protections of collective bargaining by workers with their employers over wages and working conditions.”).
101. Brown v. Pro Football, 50 F.3d 1041, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).
102. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2018) (§ 6 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731) (emphasis added).
103. Labor, WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY (1913 ed.).
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When looking closely at the text of Section 6, it does not mention “employees,” nor does it imply that only employees’ or specific types of workers’ organizations and activities are exempted from antitrust liability.
Instead, Section 6 stresses the word “labor.” When the Clayton Act was
passed in 1914, Webster’s Dictionary defined labor as “[p]hysical toil or
bodily exertion . . . [or] intellectual exertion; mental effort . . . directed to
some useful end.” 103 Today, Webster’s Dictionary defines labor as
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104. Labor, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY (2019), https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/labor (Jan. 6, 2019) [https://perma.cc/7ZE9-2564].
105. 29 U.S.C. § 52 (§ 20 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 738).
106. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-02 (2018) (§§ 1-2 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70).
107. 29 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added).
108. 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (2018) (§ 13 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70) (emphasis added).
109. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emps., 481 U.S. 429, 438 (1987); see United
States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 231 (1941) (stating that the Norris-LaGuardia Act “established that
the allowable area of union activity was not to be restricted . . . to an immediate employer-employee
relation.”).
110. Jacksonville Bulk Terminals v. Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, 457 U.S. 702, 712 (1982) (emphasis added).
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“expenditure of physical or mental effort” and notes that the physical or mental effort “provides . . . goods or services in an economy.” 104
With either definition, the emphasis is on the worker’s activity and the
beneficial end result of that activity. Neither definition suggests that the
worker’s activity is controlled by an employer nor do they suggest that the
beneficial end result must work to the benefit of an employer; thus, there is
no implication of the traditional employer-employee relationship within the
definition of labor. Also, because Section 6 excludes defining labor as a commodity or article of commerce, which is bought and sold in a product market,
and because Section 6 concerns antitrust laws, which cover markets, it follows that Section 6 speaks only to labor markets. While Section 20 of the
Clayton Act does refer to “employees” in regard to limiting the authority of
federal courts to issue injunctions against labor union activities, 105 Sections
1 and 2 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which also limit federal courts’ authority for issuing injunctions against labor union activities, does not refer to
“employees.” 106 Instead, Section 1 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act emphasizes
that injunctions may not be issued “in a case involving or growing out of a
labor dispute.” 107 And Section 13 of the Act defines “labor dispute” as “any
controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or concerning
the association or representation of persons in negotiating . . . terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not disputants stand in proximate relation of employer and employee.” 108
Thus, the Act clarifies that a labor dispute can arise in contexts outside
of the traditional employer-employee relationship. Indeed, the Supreme
Court clarified that a “labor dispute” can arise out of a labor union’s activity
“directed at the primary employer or at neutral ‘secondary’ employers,” i.e.,
third parties. 109 And the Court further iterated that “the term ‘labor dispute’
must not be narrowly construed because the statutory definition itself is extremely broad.” 110 All things considered, the text of the Clayton Act and the
Norris-LaGuardia Act suggest that the Labor Exemption covers more than
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just statutorily-labeled employees and instead, can cover a particular labor
market.
2. The Purpose of the Labor Exemption & the On-Demand Driver
Labor Market
The Clayton Act protects labor groups from antitrust liability when
those groups’ activities aim to improve workers’ wages and working conditions. 111 And Section 2 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act builds on this purpose
as it states:
Whereas under prevailing economic conditions . . . the individual unorganized worker is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract
and to protect his freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain acceptable terms
and conditions of employment . . . it is necessary that he have full freedom
of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of his
own choosing, to negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment. 112

06/12/2020 13:18:38

111. Iglitzin & Robbins, supra note 2, at 57.
112. 29 U.S.C. § 102 (2018) (§ 2 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70).
113. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 235–36.
114. See id. at 229–31.
115. Perritt, supra note 9, at 144.
116. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 1002.
117. Id. at 998.
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The Supreme Court explained that the Act aimed “to restore the broad
purpose which Congress thought it had formulated in the Clayton Act.” 113
And that broad purpose was to protect labor union collective bargaining activities—centered on improving workers’ wages and conditions—beyond
the context of an employer-employee relationship.114
When considering the exchange of labor by an on-demand driver in return for payment by a consumer and the ride-hailing company receiving a
percentage of that payment, “[o]ne can plausibly argue that [it is the] kind of
exchange . . . within the scope of Norris-LaGuardia and is clearly what the
statute meant to protect.” 115 And when more specifically considering the current conditions of the labor market for on-demand drivers, their exclusion
from the federal right to bargain collectively “has perpetuated an imbalance
of economic bargaining power that labor and employment laws were intended to redress.” 116 This imbalance of bargaining power has crippled the
on-demand driver labor market in several ways.
First, on-demand drivers “typically experience high levels of income
volatility” because most on-demand drivers are young adults and low-income individuals. 117 Typically, federal labor policy in the United States has
sought to aid such workers in their pursuit of higher wages and better
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118. Id.
119. Id. at 994.
120. Perritt, supra note 9, at 129.
121. See id. at 136–38.
122. See Steinmetz, supra note 7 (noting that some on-demand drivers “use the platform 50 hours a
week to feed themselves.”); Harris, supra note 77, at 272 (observing that on-demand drivers “must put in
long hours that extend beyond the standard eight-hour workday in order to make a sufficient amount of
money.”).
123. Harris, supra note 77, at 272.
124. See Kennedy, supra note 1, at 1001.
125. Perritt, supra note 9, at 137.
126. Katy Steinmetz, California Bill Would Allow Uber, Lyft Drivers to Negotiate as a Group, TIME
MAG. (Mar. 10, 2016), http://time.com/4254100/uber-lyft-california-collective-bargain-bill/
[http://perma.cc/GCT9-369X].
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working conditions, given that they may “lack the education, skills, and other
economic leverage” to negotiate for better terms and conditions of their labor. 118 Yet on-demand drivers’ wage insecurity has grown in the gig economy, 119 as many on-demand drivers have experienced wrongful deductions
from their pay.120 But under the Seattle Ordinance, on-demand drivers could
bargain collectively over wrongful compensation deductions, as well as
other payment-related issues, which would ultimately provide on-demand
drivers with better wage security. 121
Second, many on-demand drivers are turning to ride-hailing companies
as their primary source of income, but their wages are still low despite the
fact that some on-demand drivers are working more than forty hours a
week. 122 This is not surprising given that on-demand drivers’ costs include
“the time lost waiting for and picking up a [consumer], vehicle maintenance
costs, insurance fees, and gas expenses.” 123 Lastly, because their wages are
usually low, on-demand drivers may have to rely on government assistance
more frequently, which has negative consequences for taxpayers and government budgeting. 124
However, by providing on-demand drivers with a way to bargain collectively, like the Seattle Ordinance has set out to do, it would “give[] them
a sense of empowerment and even[] out the balance of power” between ondemand drivers and ride-hailing companies. 125 Indeed, the primary sponsor
of the Seattle Ordinance, Mike O’Brien, stated that the Ordinance intended
“to give drivers ‘a voice’ on the job” after he “witness[ed] how little power
drivers themselves had in working for a living wage.” 126 Therefore, given
that the Labor Exemption’s broad purpose is to protect workers who seek to
improve their wages and working conditions within a particular labor market, and because Seattle’s Ordinance provides a framework for on-demand
drivers to address economic disparities through collective bargaining, it is
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likely that Congress intended the Labor Exemption to cover such proposals. 127
3. The Supreme Court’s precedent suggests a broad interpretation of
the Labor Exemption.

06/12/2020 13:18:38

127. See Kennedy, supra note 1, at 1013–14.
128. See generally Perritt, supra note 9, at 143–44.
129. 315 U.S. 143, 144, 146–47 (1942).
130. See Jacksonville Bulk Terminals v. Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, 457 U.S. 702, 712 (1982).
131. Perritt, supra note 9, at 149.
132. Milk Wagon Drivers’ Union v. Lake Valley Farm Prod., Inc., 311 U.S. 91, 94–96, 98 (1940).
133. Id. at 95.
134. Id. at 93, 103.
135. Local 24, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 293 (1959).
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The Supreme Court’s earlier Labor Exemption cases furthered the view
that the Exemption only applied to employees, 128 but these cases have been
overblown and misunderstood. For example, in Columbia River Packers Association v. Hinton, which involved a buyer that processed and sold canned
fish and seller that was a fishermen’s union of independent fishermen who
caught and sold the fish to the buyer, the Court held that the Labor Exemption did not apply because the dispute between the parties was a dispute between businessmen and not a labor dispute between an employer and an
employee. 129 But Hinton embraced a narrow definition of “labor dispute”
that the Court would later reject. 130 And recent decisions by the Supreme
Court, as well as the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals and District Courts,
suggest that “[e]nough ambiguity and flexibility exists in [the] case law on
the [L]abor [E]xemption to allow them to be molded around the conditions
of [a] particular labor market[].” 131
One lines of cases has extended the Labor Exemption to workers who
were acting as independent contractors and employees simultaneously. For
example, in a labor market of milk drivers, a dispute arose between a labor
union of milk wagon drivers and a group of milk vendors who were acting
as independent contractors in nature although they were labeled as employees in their agreement with the Plaintiff.132 The milk vendors’ activity had
led to a decrease in the union workers’ employment. 133 The Supreme Court
held that the Labor Exemption applied because a labor dispute existed, as
“all the parties had direct or indirect interests in production, sale, and distribution of milk.” 134 In another instance, the Court held that a labor organization was covered by the Labor Exemption when it negotiated a minimum
rental price for motor carriers who operated as independent contractors because they owned and drove their own vehicles. 135 The Court’s reasoning for
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applying the Labor Exemption rested on the fact that the agreement was correcting an abuse that had been occurring in the particular labor market. 136
Another line of cases applied the Labor Exemption to workers who
were independent contractors because “there was ‘the presence of a job or
wage competition or some other economic interrelationship affecting legitimate union interests between the union members and the independent contractors,’” thus, making them parties to a labor dispute. 137 For example, in
H.A. Artists & Associates v. Actors’ Equity Association, the Supreme Court
held that a group of independent agents for stage actors and actresses were a
labor group, and that it was in a labor dispute with a labor union of agents
who also worked for stage actors and actresses, as both parties provided the
same type of services. 138
Both lines of cases ultimately suggest that the Labor Exemption, when
broadly defined, covers labor markets because the Court’s reasoning for applying the Exemption usually rests on a dispute’s or an agreement’s effect
on a particular labor market. Given that on-demand drivers provide the same
labor and compete for the same wages as taxi drivers do, as well as the fact
that taxi drivers are statutorily-labeled employees, 139 the Supreme Court’s
precedent suggests that the Labor Exemption would extend to a dispute in
the particular labor market that includes on-demand drivers or a collective
bargaining agreement under the Seattle Ordinance.
C. The Labor Exemption extends to the on-demand drivers under the
Seattle Ordinance.
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136. Id. at 293–94.
137. Am. Fed. of Musicians v. Carroll, 391 U.S. 99, 105–06 (1968) (quoting Carroll v. Am. Fed. of
Musicians, 241 F. Supp. 865, 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)).
138. 451 U.S. 704, 706, 721 (1981). But see L.A. Meat & Provision Drivers Union v. United States,
371 U.S. 94, 98 (1962) (holding that the Labor Exemption did not apply to a group of independent contractors when “[t]here was no showing of any actual or potential wage or job competition, or of any other
economic interrelationship, between the [independent contractors] and the . . . members of the union.”).
139. See Checker Taxi Co., Inc., v. Nat’l Prod. Workers Union, 113 F.R.D. 561, 562 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
140. Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 613 (8th Cir. 1976) (citations omitted).
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Because the Labor Exemption broadly extends to cover particular labor
markets and not just employees, whether it covers the on-demand drivers
under the Seattle Ordinance “turns on whether the relevant federal labor policy is deserving of pre-eminence over federal antitrust policy under the circumstances of the particular case.”140 Given that the Seattle Ordinance
provides a framework for on-demand drivers to restrain competition through
wage fixing agreements with ride-hailing companies, it “embodies the inherent tension between antitrust policy, which is designed to maximize . . .
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141. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 1022.
142. 543 F.2d at 614.
143. See Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124, 133–34 (2d Cir. 2004).
144. See In re Detroit Auto Dealers Ass’n, 955 F.2d 457, 463 (6th Cir. 1992); Cont’l Mar. of S.F.,
Inc. v. Pac. Coast Metal Trades Dist. Council, 817 F.2d 1391, 1393 (9th Cir. 1987).
145. See Bridgeman v. Nat’l Basketball Asso., 675 F. Supp. 960, 964 (D.N.J. 1987); Zimmerman v.
Nat’l Football League, 632 F. Supp. 398, 403–04 (D.D.C. 1986).
146. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614 (citations omitted).
147. SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 6.310.735(H)(1) (2015).
148. Connell Constr. Co., Inc. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622 (1975).
149. § 6.310.735(H)(1); see Brown v. Pro Football, 50 F.3d 1041, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(“[R]estraints on competition lawfully imposed through the collective bargaining process are exempted
from antitrust liability so long as such restraints primarily affect only the labor market organized around
the collective bargaining relationship.”).
150. Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Jewel Tea Co., Inc.,
381 U.S. 676, 690 n.5 (1965).
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competition, and national labor policy, which is designed to promote cooperation between workers in the face of employer economic power.” 141
In Mackey v. NFL, the Eighth Circuit set forth a three-prong test for
determining whether the non-statutory Labor Exemption applies,142 and although not every Circuit has adopted the Mackey test,143 it has been adopted
by the Sixth and Ninth Circuits, 144 as well as by District Courts in the Third
Circuit and the District of Columbia. 145 Under the Mackey test, the non-statutory Labor Exemption applies when “[1] the restraint on trade primarily
affects only the parties to the collective bargaining relationship . . . [2] where
the agreement sought to be exempted concerns a mandatory subject of collective bargaining [and] . . . [3] where the agreement sought to be exempted
is the product of bona fide arm’s-length bargaining.” 146
Under the Seattle Ordinance, a collective bargaining agreement would
primarily affect the on-demand drivers for whom the agreement was negotiated and the ride-hailing company for whom the on-demand drivers provide
their labor. The Ordinance expresses that permissible subjects of negotiations are “the nature and amount of payments to be made by, or withheld
from, the [ride-hailing company] to or by the [on-demand] drivers . . . [and]
conditions of work,”147 which aligns with the Supreme Court’s emphasis that
the non-statutory Labor Exemption applies to agreements “over wages and
working conditions.” 148 Also, the Ordinance expresses that the representative and the ride-hailing company are the only parties to the collective bargaining relationship. 149
Turning to the second prong, whether an agreement concerns a mandatory subject depends “not [on] the form of the agreement—e. g., prices or
wages—but [on] its relative impact on the product market and the interests
of union members.” 150 Similarly to Oliver, any agreement arising out of the
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collective bargaining process under the Seattle Ordinance would largely affect only the labor market and not the product market. 151 Any minimal effects
on the product market are more extensively discussed infra in Section
III.B.3. And in regard to the interests of on-demand drivers, “the growth of
the gig economy has created a critical demand for better wages and working
conditions,” 152 which on-demand drivers could collectively bargain for,
given that the Ordinance expressly permits it. Hence, the Ordinance advances the goals of federal labor law, which seeks to alleviate economic inequality, and the goals of antitrust laws, which seeks to protect consumers. 153
Finally, under the Ordinance’s framework, any agreement that would
arise between the on-demand drivers and the ride-hailing company would be
a product of bona fide arm’s-length bargaining. The Ordinance explicitly authorizes the representative and the ride-hailing company to “meet and negotiate in good faith.”154 And the Ordinance’s framework correlates with the
congressional policy favoring collective bargaining, which rejects “anticompetitive agreements imposed unilaterally by one party, usually management, without regard to the interests of the other [party].” 155 Given that each
prong of the Mackey test is satisfied by the Seattle Ordinance’s framework,
the non-statutory Labor Exemption would apply to an agreement collectively
bargained for by the representative and the ride-hailing company.
III. THE SEATTLE ORDINANCE IS EXEMPTED FROM ANTITRUST
LIABILITY UNDER THE RULE OF REASON.
A. The Seattle Ordinance should be analyzed by the Rule of Reason
because the Ordinance is not per se unreasonable.
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151. See Local 24, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 294 (1959).
152. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 1002.
153. See id. at 1036.
154. § 6.310.735(H)(1).
155. Zimmerman v. Nat’l Football League, 632 F. Supp. 398, 406 (D.D.C. 1986).
156. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018).
157. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59–60 (1911).
158. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (citations omitted).
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The Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits “[e]very contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States.”156 Because the Supreme Court interpreted
“restraint of trade” to mean an “undue restraint,”157 it concluded that “Congress intended to outlaw only unrestrainable restraints [of trade].”158 Therefore, in order to determine whether an agreement violates the Sherman
Antitrust Act, courts first consider whether the agreement imposes a restraint
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159. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
160. Perritt, supra note 38, at 128.
161. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2283–84 (2018) (citing Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp
Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 730 (1988)).
162. Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 47–50 (1990).
163. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 602–03, 608 (1972).
164. Dep’t of Fin. & Admin. Servs., For-Hire Driver Collective Bargaining, SEATTLE.GOV,
https://www.seattle.gov/business-regulations/taxis-for-hires-and-tncs/for-hire-driver-collective-bargaining [http://perma.cc/DN2A-SFK].
165. Perritt, supra note 9, at 125.
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that is per se unreasonable; and if the agreement does not impose a restraint
that is per se unreasonable, courts then determine whether the agreement unreasonably restrains trade under the Rule of Reason. 159
Restraints are per se unreasonable when they concern “naked price fixing or output restrictions.” 160 Also, “[t]ypically only ‘horizonal’ restraints—
restraints ‘imposed by agreement between competitors’—qualify as unreasonable per se.” 161 For example, where two providers of bar review courses
agreed to share revenue, not to compete with one another in certain territories, and then raised the price of their courses to consumers, the Supreme
Court held that the arrangement was a per se violation of the Sherman Act. 162
In another instance, where a local grocery association restricted its members
from selling products in territories outside of each members’ exclusively licensed territory, the arrangement qualified as unreasonable per se.163
Turning to the Seattle Ordinance, because the City of Seattle has agreed
to not enforce the Ordinance while the District Court hears arguments regarding the federal antitrust claims, there has not been any collectively bargained for agreements between a representative and a ride-hailing company
in Seattle.164 So, for the purposes of Part III, I analyze a hypothetical agreement (“the collective agreement”) between a representative and a ride-hailing company, in which on-demand drivers earn a larger percentage of the
wage that they receive from each ride. Given that “[a] substantial portion of
the complaints by Uber drivers relate[] to perceived inadequacy of compensation,” 165 I presume that increasing the percentage that the on-demand drivers retain from each ride’s cost will be the most pressing topic of negotiation
for the representative.
At first glance, aside from the vertical agreement between the representative and the ride-hailing company, the collective agreement includes a
horizontal agreement (“the horizontal agreement”) among the on-demand
drivers to fix the percentage that they retain for each ride’s cost. Because the
on-demand drivers, as independent contractors, are not statutorily-labeled
employees, they are outside the scope of the Labor Exemption, as it is
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166. See Paul, supra note 80, at 234–36.
167. Mark Anderson & Max Huffman, The Sharing Economy Meets the Sherman Act: Is Uber a
Firm, a Cartel, or Something in Between?, 2017 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 859, 908 (2018).
168. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007) (citation omitted)
(“Restraints that are per se unlawful include horizontal agreements among competitors to fix
prices . . . .”); Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 6 (2006) (citation omitted) (“Price-fixing agreements
between two or more competitors, otherwise known as horizontal price-fixing agreements, fall into the
category of arrangements that are per se unlawful.”).
169. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 240 (1899).
170. See Perritt, supra note 9, at 72.
171. Lao, supra note 92, at 1568.
172. Id. at 1566.
173. See Wilson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 940 F. Supp. 944, 954 (E.D. La. 1996) (Ruling that an agreement was not per se unreasonable because the agreement did “not eliminate price competition . . . because
there was no competition between [the parties] to eliminate.”).
174. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 100–01 (1984).
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currently understood. 166 As a result, on-demand drivers can be characterized
as competitors in the labor market, competing with each other for the rides. 167
And the horizontal agreement would be characterized as stifling such competition among the on-demand drivers. Thus, the horizontal agreement between on-demand drivers under the collective agreement seems to be the
type of anti-competitive agreement that the Supreme Court has traditionally
held to be per se unlawful. 168 However, characterizing the entire collective
agreement as per se unreasonable solely because the horizontal agreement is
present is inappropriate for the following reasons.
First, the Supreme Court directs the per se rule against horizontal agreements among individuals who are not statutorily-labeled employees because
such agreements “abolish[] all competition between the parties” in the labor
market at issue. 169 But in the on-demand driver labor market presently, the
ride-hailing companies set the percentage that they retain from the on-demand drivers in regard to each ride’s cost, 170 preventing any competition between the drivers. 171 Unlike competitors in a particular market, on-demand
drivers “providing service on a platform are generally not independent businesses in competition with each other.” 172 Thus, it would serve no purpose
to employ the per se rule to the collective agreement because the horizontal
agreement would not create the unlawful activity of eliminating price competition, as there is not any wage competition among on-demand drivers in
the on-demand driver labor market currently. 173
Second, the Supreme Court has forgone applying the per se rule against
a horizontal agreement when the agreement was essential for a product to be
provided. 174 For example, where member institutions of the NCAA created
a horizontal agreement among themselves, in which they “place[d] a ceiling
on the number of games [that] member institutions [could] televise,” the
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175. Id. at 99, 101.
176. Anderson & Huffman, supra note 167, at 910.
177. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 993.
178. Id. (emphasis added).
179. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 100.
180. See Lao, supra note 92, at 1571 (arguing that the relatively inelastic demand for on-demand
rides would not be significantly affected by a collective bargaining agreement by on-demand drivers and
noting that such an agreement would not lead to a substantial increase in the price of rides).
181. See Mansoor Iqbal, Uber Revenue and Usage Statistics, BUSINESS OF APPS (Nov. 28, 2018),
http://www.businessofapps.com/data/uber-statistics/ (“As of August 2018, 436,000 Uber rides took place
per day, compared to 275,000 taxi rides, and 122,000 Lyft rides.”).
182. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 100–01 (1984); see, e.g., United States v. Capitol Serv., Inc., 756
F.2d 502, 506 n.1 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting how the Supreme Court did not apply the per se rule to a
horizontal agreement because “the unique circumstances . . . called for the application of the Rule of
Reason rather than the per se rule.”); R.C. Dick Geothermal Corp. v. Thermogenics, Inc., 890 F.2d 139,
163 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (Norris, J., dissenting) (“The Supreme Court has been reluctant to treat
novel types of business relationships under per se rules . . . .”). But see Gelboim v. Bank of Am. Corp.,
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Supreme Court did not apply the per se rule because horizontal agreements
between the institutions, such as the extensive rules that apply to all NCAA
athletes, were necessary in order to provide college sporting events for consumers. 175 And here, “at least some form of horizontal cooperation is necessary for the ride service to be offered to consumers through [a ride-hailing
company’s] app.” 176 While many ride-hailing companies have characterized
themselves as technology companies, “the technological platform itself is
valueless without the labor powering its application.” 177 Given that ride-hailing companies “depend[] almost entirely upon the efficiency with which
[their platforms] extract labor from the workers who provide the [on-demand
rides],” 178 the necessary relationship between the on-demand drivers and the
platform suggests that it would be inappropriate to immediately characterize
the collective agreement as per se unreasonable.
Third, the Supreme Court has applied the per se rule to horizontal agreements that restrict output.179 But here, the collective agreement is unlikely to
substantially restrict output because even a slightly minor increase in the
price of rides would not disincentive consumers from using a ride-hailing
company’s service, 180 given the convenience of on-demand rides and consumers’ high demand for them.181 Even if the collective agreement results in
some output restrictions, the Rule of Reason would more carefully consider
the output restrictions’ anti-competitive effects in the on-demand driver labor market, as well as the product market. Thus, output ’restrictions anticipated anti-competitive effects are more extensively discussed infra in
Section III.B.3.
Lastly, the Supreme Court has hesitated in applying the per se rule to
horizontal agreements that are uniquely different from the typical price-fixing horizontal agreements that are considered per se unreasonable. 182 The
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per se rule is “invoked when surrounding circumstances make the likelihood
of anticompetitive so great as to rend unjustified further examination of the
challenged conduct.” 183 But here, because the gig economy has created new
and unique relationships between laborers and on-demand companies and
because the Seattle Ordinance is the first of its kind,184 the collective agreement is precisely the type of novel and unfamiliar arrangement that requires
further inquiry under the Rule of Reason.
In addition to why the per se rule should not be applied, one reason for
applying the Rule of Reason is that ride-hailing companies’ platforms are
two-sided platforms, 185 and the Supreme Court has analyzed such platforms
under the Rule of Reason. 186 To clarify, a ride-hailing company’s platform
is two-sided because it transacts with on-demand drivers in the labor market
who are looking for a platform as a means to perform labor and the platform
simultaneously transacts with consumers in the product market who are
looking for on-demand rides. Given that two-sided platforms are relatively
complex, the Rule of Reason should be employed to fully analyze the collective agreement’s effects on competition in the on-demand driver labor
market.
B. Applying the Rule of Reason to the Seattle Ordinance

06/12/2020 13:18:38

823 F.3d 759, 771 (2d Cir. 2016) (citation omitted) (“The unfamiliar context of appellants’ horizontal
price-fixing claims provides no basis to disturb application of the per se rule.”).
183. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 at 103–04 (footnote omitted).
184. Steinmetz, supra note 126.
185. Perritt, supra note 9, at 75.
186. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2280–87 (2018).
187. Id. at 2284 (quoting Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984)).
188. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (citation omitted).
189. Brown v. Pro Football, No. 90-1071 (RCL), 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2903, at *28 (D.C. Cir.
Mar. 10, 1992) (quoting Smith v. Pro Football, 593 F.2d 1173, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1978)).
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Under the Rule of Reason, “courts . . . conduct a fact-specific assessment of ‘market power and market structure . . . to assess the [restraint]’s
actual effect’ on competition.” 187 Additionally, courts “tak[e] into account a
variety of factors, including specific information about the relevant business,
its conditions before and after the restraint was imposed, and the restraint’s
history, nature, or effect.” 188 If a court finds that the agreement imposes a
restraint that has a legitimate business purpose and promotes competition,
“the court must then balance the ‘anticompetitive [effects]’ of the challenged
restraint against its ‘procompetitive [effects].’”189 If the anti-competitive effects outweigh the pro-competitive effects, then the restraint is unlawful
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under the Sherman Antitrust Act, but if the pro-competitive effects outweigh
the anti-competitive effects, then the restraint is lawful. 190
Aside from the horizontal agreement, which is naturally presumed to be
anti-competitive,191 the collective agreement imposes a pro-competitive vertical price restraint. A vertical price restraint is defined as an “agreement[]
involving actors at different levels of a distribution chain to set either minimum or maximum prices.” 192 Vertical price restraints typically occur between a manufacturer and a distributor or reseller, and under the collective
agreement, the ride-hailing company would provide its platform to the ondemand drivers, likewise to how a manufacturer would provide its product
to a distributor; and then, in return for a fixed percentage earned on each ride,
the on-demand driver would provide the platform’s service (in the form of
rides) to consumers, similarly to how a distributor would provide a manufacturer’s product to consumers at a fixed price. 193
Therefore, because the collective agreement imposes a vertical price restraint, it must be judged by the rule of reason. 194 And ultimately, the collective agreement’s pro-competitive effects outweigh its anti-competitive
effects because the vertical price restraint would reduce the ride-hailing company’s market power and eliminate adhesion contracts; and the vertical price
restraint would correct switching costs and price inelasticity and reduce labor
turnover in the on-demand driver labor market.
1. The vertical price restraint reduces the ride-hailing company’s market power and eliminates adhesion contracts in the on-demand driver
labor market.

06/12/2020 13:18:38

190. Id.
191. See In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 316 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting the usual
presumption that horizontal agreements are anti-competitive).
192. Marion Diagnostic Ctr., LLC v. Becton, Dickinson, & Co., No. 18-CV-01059-NJR-RJD, 2018
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 203407, at *10 (S.D. Ill. Nov. 30, 2018) (citation omitted).
193. See Vertical Price Restraints, MBASKOOL, https://www.mbaskool.com/business-concepts/marketing-and-strategy-terms/14294-vertical-price-restraint.html
[https://perma.cc/WG6ZAT4U].
194. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 907 (2007)
195. Fortner Enters. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503 (1969).
196. Perritt, supra note 9, at 69–70.
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Beginning with market power, the Supreme Court defined market
power as “the ability of a single seller to raise price and restrict output, for
reduced output is the almost inevitable result of higher prices.”195 Here, the
ride-hailing company is the seller, and the on-demand drivers are the buyers; 196 and the price is the percentage of each ride’s cost that the ride-hailing
company retains from the on-demand driver in exchange for the on-demand
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197. Id. at 70–71.
198. Id. at 71.
199. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. at 504.
200. See Perritt, supra note 9, at 72–73.
201. Julia Kagan, Adhesion Contract, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/adhesion-contract.asp [https://perma.cc/S769-B99X].
202. Perritt, supra note 9, at 72.
203. Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 124968 § 1(E) (2015).
204. Perritt, supra note 9, at 71; see N.Y. Shipping Asso. v. Fed. Mar. Com., 854 F.2d 1338, 1357
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (noting that “a regime of adhesion contracts[] limits competition.”).
205. SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 6.310.735(H)(1) (2015).
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driver’s use of its platform. Within the on-demand driver labor market, an
oligopsony exists because there are few ride-hailing companies who provide
platforms, and there are many on-demand drivers who utilize the platforms
in order to provide on-demand rides. 197 Therefore, a few ride-hailing companies dominate the on-demand driver labor market, and as a result, “they
have some degree of control over the [wages] they pay” to the on-demand
drivers. 198 Hence, the Supreme Court’s “concern . . . [that] the seller has the
power to raise prices, or impose other burdensome terms” exists within the
on-demand driver labor market. 199
And the ride-hailing companies’ market power is illustrated by adhesion contracts that pervade the on-demand driver labor market.200 Adhesion
contracts occur when “one party has substantially more power than the other
in creating the contract.” 201 When considering the on-demand driver labor
market, ride-hailing companies have disproportionate power, given that each
ride-hailing company sets the terms for using its platform, and on-demand
drivers “must accept them or not, on a take-it-or-leave-it [basis].” 202 Indeed,
Seattle’s City Council noted that ride-hailing companies “establish the terms
and conditions of their drivers unilaterally, and may impose changes in driver
compensation rates or deactivate drivers from dispatched services without
prior discussion or warning.” 203 Thus, ride-hailing companies function
through adhesion contracts, which “preclude bargaining between buyer and
seller, an assumption that underlies the model of perfect competition.”204
However, the collective agreement would advance competition because
the vertical price restraint would reduce the ride-hailing company’s market
power, and it would eliminate adhesion contracts in the on-demand driver
labor market. Because the Seattle Ordinance permits the representative and
the ride-hailing company to bargain collectively in regard to “the nature and
amount of payments to be made by, or withheld from, the [ride-hailing company] to or by the [on-demand] drivers,” 205 the vertical price restraint would
diminish the ride-hailing company’s market power—significantly undercutting the ride-hailing company’s ability to unilaterally control prices. And in
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turn, the ride-hailing company could no longer utilize adhesion contracts,
given that the vertical price restraint would be the result of a collectively
bargained for agreement.
Lastly, because the on-demand driver labor market is currently anticompetitive due to the ride-hailing companies’ control over the percentage
of each ride’s cost that they retain from each on-demand driver, the vertical
price restraint would not create an anti-competitive effect; but instead, the
vertical price restraint would “enable more stable [wages and] working conditions and better ensure that [on-demand] drivers can perform their services
in a . . . stable, cost-effective, and economically viable manner.”206 Thus, it
would create a pro-competitive effect in the on-demand driver labor market. 207
2. The vertical price restraint corrects market inefficiencies.

06/12/2020 13:18:38

206. ORDINANCE 124968 § 1(I).
207. See Comcast Cable Communs., LLC v. FCC, 717 F.3d 982, 990 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Kavanaugh,
J., concurring) (citation omitted) (“[A]bsent market power . . . vertical contracts are procompetitive.”).
208. Id.
209. Perritt, supra note 9, at 71.
210. Will Kenton, Switching Costs, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/switchingcosts.asp [https://perma.cc/U5K3-MVD8].
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Vertical price restraints, and in general, “vertical contracts in a competitive market encourage . . . innovation . . . and create efficiencies – and thus
reduce prices and lead to better goods and services for consumers.” 208 The
vertical price restraint, as imposed by the collective agreement, would (1)
correct switching costs, (2) fix price inelasticity, and (3) reduce labor turnover in the on-demand driver labor market.
Returning to the current labor market for on-demand drivers, further
barriers to competition exist given that oligopsonies (the ride-hailing companies), “exemplify a number of . . . market failure[s]” such as “switching
costs . . . and price inelasticity.” 209 “Switching costs are the costs that a consumer incurs as a result of changing brands, suppliers or products.” 210 Again,
here, the on-demand driver is characterized as the consumer, choosing
among the ride-hailing companies’ platforms that she or he wishes to utilize,
and the ride-hailing company provides the product in the form of a platform.
Switching costs considerations to an on-demand driver include not only the
price differences among ride-hailing companies—specifically, the percentage of each ride’s cost that each ride-hailing company retains from the ondemand driver—but also the fact that most ride-hailing companies’
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211. See id. (“Although most prevalent switching costs are monetary in nature . . . [a] switching cost
can manifest itself in the form of . . . a failure to obtain similar replacement of products or services.”).
212. Marc Pomp, et al., Switch on the Competition Clauses, Consequences and Policy Implications
of Consumer Switching Costs, 97 CPB NETHERLANDS BUREAU FOR ECON. POL’Y ANALYSIS 1, 15 (2005),
https://www.cpb.nl/sites/default/files/publicaties/download/switch-competition-causes-consequencesand-policy-implications-consumer-switching-costs.pdf [http://perma.cc/B2VB-FMXY0].
213. Perritt, supra note 9, at 73–74.
214. See generally Pauline T. Kim, Norms, Learning, and Law: Exploring the Influences on Workers’ Legal Knowledge, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 447, 482 n.138 (noting that a decrease in output creates a
decrease in revenue).
215. See Stefan Bechtold, Digital Rights Management in the United States and Europe, 52 AM. J.
COMP. L. 323, 362 (2004).
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platforms are easily substitutable for one another in regard to the on-demand
driver’s ability to provide on-demand rides. 211
Low switching costs can be anti-competitive because if “[on-demand
drivers] fail to base their choices on differences in prices . . . liberalisation of
markets will not be successful.” 212 And currently, switching costs are low for
on-demand drivers. 213 Without the vertical price restraint, the price differences among the platforms are immaterial to the on-demand drivers, given
that they utilize multiple platforms. However, with the vertical price restraint, the price differences among the platforms would become a significant
consideration for an on-demand driver. For example, if the original vertical
price restraint set forth that the on-demand drivers retain 76.5% of each
ride’s cost, and subsequently, a collective agreement by a separate representative and ride-hailing company sets forth that the on-demand drivers retain 78% of each ride’s cost, on-demand drivers will increasingly utilize the
latter ride-hailing company’s platform.
In response, the original ride-hailing company will have to either match
or raise the percentage that its on-demand drivers retain for each ride’s cost
in order to avoid a low supply of on-demand drivers and thus, avoid a decrease in output and revenue. 214 Ensuing collective agreements among the
remaining ride-hailing companies in Seattle’s on-demand driver labor market will vary in regard to the percentage (per ride) retained by each ridehailing company’s on-demand drivers, but enough price differences among
the platforms will exist, increasing switching costs for an individual on-demand driver. While higher switching costs in other contexts can have anticompetitive effects, 215 here, a ride-hailing company could employ its collective agreement to gain a competitive edge in the on-demand driver labor
market by offering a more attractive price, which in turn, will foster
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216. See generally F.T.C. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 598 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“Economies achieved by one firm may stimulate matching innovation by others, the very essence
of competition.”).
217. Will Kenton, Price Elasticity of Demand, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/priceelasticity.asp [https://perma.cc/9L2R-BBUH].
218. Price Inelastic, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/price-inelastic [https://perma.cc/H663-W4UQ].
219. See generally JPMorgan Chase & Co. Inst., The Online Platform Economy in 2018: Drivers,
Workers, Sellers, and Lessors, JPMORGAN CHASE & CO. (2018), https://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/institute/report-ope-2018.htm [https://perma.cc/Z6B7-6F-G].
220. See Razak v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 16-573, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61230, at *53–54 (E.D. Pa.
Apr. 11, 2018) (“Uber’s drivers depend on Uber’s technology [for] getting jobs.”).
221. Perritt, supra note 9, at 71.
222. See Sean Ross, Types of Consumer Goods That Show the Price Elasticity of Demand,
INVESTOPEDIA (Dec. 5, 2019) https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/012615/what-types-consumer-goods-demonstrate-price-elasticity-demand.asp [https://perma.cc/A68K-WASY] (“If the good
has plenty of competitive substitutes, elasticity tends to be greater because consumers can easily make a
switch when prices rise too much.”).
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innovative responses by the other ride-hailing companies, 216— effectuating
a more competitive on-demand driver labor market.
Turning to price inelasticity, for this Note’s purposes, I assume that under the collective agreement, percentage rates retained by on-demand drivers
during “surge pricing” will be an issue that is negotiated separately, from the
issue of percentage rates retained by on-demand drivers for each ride’s cost
when “surge pricing” is not occurring; thus, the following price elasticity
analysis exclusively focuses on the latter of the two issues. The price elasticity of demand is an “economic measure of the change in the quantity demanded . . . of a product in relation to its price change.” 217 When the price is
inelastic, its price “does not change even if supply or demand go up or
down.” 218 Presently, the price elasticity of demand in the on-demand driver
labor market is relatively inelastic because on-demand drivers’ demand to
utilize the platforms is insensitive to the set percentage rates that the ridehailing companies retain for each ride’s cost,219 as on-demand drivers depend
on the platforms to provide rides in order to make extra money or earn a
living. 220 Price inelasticity of demand in the on-demand driver labor market
is anti-competitive “because it [hinders] driver willingness to look for a better deal.” 221
But, with the vertical price restraint and successive collective agreements by other ride-hailing companies, as discussed earlier, the price elasticity of demand in the on-demand labor market will become more elastic
because on-demand drivers will become more sensitive to the percentage rate
differences among ride-hailing companies. 222 And in an on-demand driver
labor market where switching costs are high and where the price elasticity of
demand is elastic, on-demand drivers will have reasonable substitutes among
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the platforms and will choose whichever platform is most attractive in regard
to price. Thus, the vertical price restraint corrects price inelasticity of demand in the labor market, creating a pro-competitive effect in the on-demand
driver labor market.223
Lastly, labor turnover is “the rate at which [laborers] leave a company
and are replaced by new [laborers].” 224 In a competitive labor market, a lower
labor turnover would promote productivity. 225 However, in the current ondemand driver labor market, “low pay is resulting in turnover,” 226 which affects the ride-hailing company’s output in the product market, as there have
been “transportation service disruptions around the country.” 227 But the vertical price restraint would reduce labor turnover because the improved wages
and working conditions would eliminate the low pay that is causing the turnover; “and thus keep a stable supply of experienced drivers on the road.”228
Studies have demonstrated that “members of collective bargaining units are
more likely to stay in their jobs than other workers,”229 and the City of Seattle
concluded that on-demand drivers who are working under conditions they
agreed to are more likely to “devote more time to their work as [on-demand]
drivers, because the terms are more likely to be satisfactory and responsive
to the drivers’ needs and concerns.”230 Therefore, the vertical price restraint
would “lead[] to lower workforce turnover and increased worker productivity,” 231 creating a pro-competitive effect in the on-demand driver labor market.
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223. See generally Jonathan M. Orszag & Loren K. Smith, Toward a More Complete Treatment of
Efficiencies in Merger Analysis: Lessons from Recent Challenges, 16-1 ANTITRUST SRC. 1, 4 n.18 (2016),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/oct16_orszag_10_18f.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UHE6-SWNX] (“[M]arkets that experience more competition are associated with
higher price elasticity of demand . . . .”).
224. Labour Turnover, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/labour-turnover [https://perma.cc/U2FE-WJM].
225. See generally Peggie R. Smith, Elder Care, Gender, and Work: The Work-Family Issue of the
21st Century, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 351, 376 (2004) (observing for example, how private
pensions during the industrial revolution “decrease[d] labor turnover . . . which promoted workplace
productivity.”).
226. Howard Greenwich & Hays Witt, Driving Public Good: How Collective Bargaining Can Increase Reliability & Safety in the Seattle For-Hire Transportation System, PUGET SOUND SAGE & P’SHIP
FOR WORKING FAMILIES 21 (2015), http://pugetsoundsage.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/DrivingPublicGood.pdf [https://perma.cc/6YEL-9F4G].
227. Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 124968 § 1(F) (2015).
228. Greenwich & Witt, supra note 226, at 3.
229. Id. at 21.
230. 124968 § (I)(1).
231. Greenwich & Witt, supra note 226, at 21.
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232. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2284 (2018) (citations omitted).
233. See Greenwich & Witt, supra note 226, at 3.
234. See Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. City of Seattle, 890 F.3d 769, 777 (9th Cir.
2018).
235. See generally Joel M. Wallace, Rambus v. F.T.C. in the Context of Standard-Setting Organizations, Antitrust, and the Patent Hold-up Problem, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 661, 663, 665 (2009) (observing how technology lock in can be an anticompetitive issue); Perritt, supra note 38, at 132.
236. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 992.
237. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2287.
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The Supreme Court has stated that anti-competitive effects typically include “reduced output, increased prices, or decreased quality in the relevant
market.” 232 In regard to reduced output of supply in the on-demand driver
labor market, it seems counterintuitive that the vertical price restraint would
dissuade on-demand drivers from utilizing the particular ride-hailing company’s platform, given that the drivers would retain a larger percentage of
each ride’s cost in comparison to utilizing other ride-hailing companies’ platforms who have not yet reached a collective agreement with a representative.
Indeed, a lower labor turnover in the on-demand driver labor market, as a
result of the vertical price restraint, would increase the output of supply in
the labor market, not reduce it. 233
Also, because the Seattle Ordinance positions the on-demand drivers as
independent contractors and not as employees,234 it seems unlikely that the
collective agreement would lock in the on-demand drivers to the agreement
to only utilizing that particular ride-hailing company’s platform and thus,
creating an anti-competitive effect in the on-demand driver labor market by
restricting the supply of labor. 235 Instead, on-demand drivers would still have
the same freedom to use multiple platforms to provide on-demand rides because it is unlikely that a ride-hailing company would agree to any terms
under the collective agreement that would severely hinder the company’s
ability to “tout flexibility and convenience for . . . [its’] workers,” given that
flexibility and convenience is what has made ride-hailing companies so popular to begin with. 236
Next, as previously mentioned, “[e]valuating both sides of a two-sided
transaction platform is . . . necessary to accurately assess competition.” 237
Therefore, it is necessary to consider reduced output in the product market
but doing so necessarily requires examining price increases in the product
market because ride-hailing companies, in response to retaining a smaller
percentage of each ride’s cost due to the collective agreement, will seek to
maximize their profits; thus, they will likely pass at least some, if not most,
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238. See Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson, US Companies Push Rising Costs on to Customers, FIN.
TIMES (Aug. 19, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/500a359c-a369-11e8-8ecf-a7ae1beff35b
[https://perma.cc/5QHE-XNGY] (noting that as a result of increased costs, including labor costs, companies in the United States are increasingly raising the prices of their products to consumers in order to
offset the increased costs).
239. Perritt, supra note 9, at 77.
240. Greenwich & Witt, supra note 226, at 3 (emphasis added).
241. Id. at 3, 5–6.
242. See Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 124968 § 1(I)(1) (2015) (finding that the Seattle Ordinance “will
improve the safety and reliability of the [on-demand] transportation services provided by the [ride-hailing
companies] and reduce the safety and reliability problems created by frequent turnover in the [on-demand] services industry.”).
243. Greenwich & Witt, supra note 226, at 22.
244. Id. at 5.
245. The Most Dangerous Time to Drive: As We ‘Fall Back’ to Shorter Days, Take Extra Care on
the Road, NAT’L SAFETY COUNCIL, https://www.nsc.org/road-safety/safety-topics/night-driving
[https://perma.cc/J3PZ-WH3T].
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of the cost off to consumers by increasing the cost of rides, possibly creating
an anti-competitive effect.238 However, “[d]emand-side studies reinforce the
intuition that passengers are relatively insensitive to price, but more sensitive
to waiting times . . . .” 239 In Seattle, consumers “take[] over five million [ondemand] trips each year and, with demand growing, the number of trips provided is increasing.” 240 Furthermore, mobility impaired consumers with limited transportation options and consumers without access to public
transportation rely on on-demand rides to get around. 241 Thus, consumers’
high demand for on-demand rides is unlikely to be significantly affected by
a minor increase in the price of rides.
Turning to reduced quality of the platform in the product market, the
increased supply of on-demand drivers, as a result of the vertical price restraint, will likely decrease waiting times for consumers, improving the overall quality of the platform’s service.242 And low labor turnover may
ultimately lead to safer rides for considers, given that “increased safety has
been associated with longer job tenure, and longer tenure will result in more
experienced [on-demand] drivers on the road, increasing both safety and reliability for the whole [on-demand] system.” 243 Increased safety is especially
critical to “[t]ravelers making late night trips for recreation, airport journeys
and after-hour commutes [who] have long-relied on [on-demand] services,” 244 given that “the risk of a fatal crash is three times greater at
night . . . .” 245 Thus, in the product market, the vertical price restraint would
improve the quality of the ride-hailing company’s platform by increasing the
safety of its use.
However, when considering reduced quality of the platform for the ondemand drivers, one could argue that the ride-hailing company would respond to the foregone revenue caused by the collective agreement by cutting

42394-ckt_95-1 Sheet No. 170 Side B

06/12/2020 13:18:38

12 ALEKNAVICUS MACRO 1 EIC 5.4 (DO NOT DELETE)

332

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

5/8/2020 11:26 PM

[Vol 95:1

06/12/2020 13:18:38

246. See generally Michael Reich, et al., Effects of a $15 Minimum Wage in California and Fresno,
INST. FOR RESEARCH ON LAB. & EMP. 26 (2017), http://irle.berkeley.edu/files/2017/Effects-of-a-15-Minimum-Wage-in-California-and-Fresno.pdf [https://perma.cc/U5Q4-WZ69].
247. Will Kenton, Race to the Bottom, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/racebottom.asp [https://perma.cc/59ST-9M2A].
248. SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 6.310.735(J) (2015).
249. Id.
250. Id. § 6.310.735(M)(1)(b)(1).
251. Id. § 6.310.735(M)(1)(b)(3).
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internal costs, including maintenance costs, 246 which could reduce the quality of the platform for the on-demand drivers. If other ride-hailing companies
subsequently reach collective agreements and respond in a similar manner
as the original ride-hailing company, it could generate a “race to the bottom”
in the on-demand driver labor market where ride-hailing companies would
“attempt[] to undercut the competition’s prices” by scarifying the quality of
their platforms for on-demand drivers.247 And if the “race to the bottom”
renders the platform increasingly difficult to use by the on-demand drivers,
that effect could spill over into the product market, decreasing the overall
quality of rides for consumers.
But a “race to the bottom” is unlikely to occur because the Seattle Ordinance’s framework prevents ride-hailing companies from undermining the
purposes of the Ordinance. First, if the representative believes that the platform is deteriorating in quality, due to the ride-hailing company’s maintenance costs cuts, the representative can submit proposed amendments (to the
collective agreement) to the director.248 These amendments would likely entail that the ride-hailing company maintain the platform to an acceptable
standard. Because such amendments would “further[] . . . safe, reliable and
economical [on-demand] transportation services and the public policy goals”
of the Ordinance, 249 the director would likely approve the amendments.
Second, if such a standard for the platform is already present in the collective agreement, the representative can allege that the ride-hailing company has violated the agreement, in which case, the director would
investigate the alleged violation; and if the director concludes that the ridehailing company has violated the collective agreement, the director would
issue the ride-hailing company a written notice, “requir[ing] the . . . entity in
violation to comply with the requirement.” 250 Furthermore, the written notice
would inform the ride-hailing company that it faces an accruing “daily penalty of up to $10,000 for every day the [ride-hailing company] fails to cure
the violation.” 251 Facing such potentially large monetary losses, the ride-hailing company would likely comply with the collective agreement by either
stopping maintenance cost cuts or by reversing course and increasing
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maintenance of the platform in order to comply with the collective agreement’s conditions for the platform. 252 Hence, the Seattle Ordinance’s framework prevents the ride-hailing company from undermining the purposes of
the Ordinance and thus, prevents a “race to the bottom” from occurring.
In conclusion, because the vertical price restraint’s pro-competitive effects, such as reducing ride-hailing companies’ market power, eliminating
adhesion contracts, correcting switching costs and price inelasticity, and reducing labor turnover in the on-demand driver labor market, outweighs the
vertical price restraint’s anti-competitive effects and the anti-competitive assumption associated with the horizontal agreement, the collective agreement
satisfies the Rule of Reason, and thus, is a reasonable and lawful restraint of
trade under the Sherman Antitrust Act.
CONCLUSION
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252. See Daniele Nosenzo, Encouraging Compliance: Bonuses Versus Fines in Inspection Games,
JLEO (2014) (“In an experiment we find that fines are effective in deterring non-compliance.”) (quotation
in Abstract).
253. Greenwich & Witt, supra note 226, at 4.
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In sum, the Seattle Ordinance “represents an innovative and real opportunity to both solve long-standing challenges in the [on-demand driver labor
market] and provide a path forward for how cities can ensure safe and reliable transportation in our ever-evolving economy.” 253 Thus, such a novel Ordinance that deals with a relatively new gig economy should invite new
thinking and reasoning in regard to the intersection of federal antitrust laws
and labor laws. So, by re-examining the Labor Exemption’s text, purpose,
and its application by the Supreme Court, there is enough support to suggest
that the Labor Exemption would exempt the Seattle Ordinance from antitrust
liability. Or, alternatively, by truly considering the Ordinance’s effects on
competition through the Rule of Reason, enough evidence suggests that it
would not violate the Sherman Antitrust Act. Either way, both arguments
demonstrate that the Seattle Ordinance is not only permissible but also, lawful.

